Pamela Chaffin v. Albertsons, Inc. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
Pamela Chaffin v. Albertsons, Inc. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
William R. Hadley; Hadley & Hadley; Attorney for Appellant.
Steven G. Morgan; Mitchel T. Rice; Attorney for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Chaffin v. Albertsons, No. 940103 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5806
U7-V-
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
05 
PAMELA CHAFFIN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
ALBERTSONS, INC., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
District Ct No. 910907736PI 
Appellate No. 940103-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, 
HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT PRESIDING. 
Steven 6. Morgan 
Mitchel T. Rice 
Attorney for Appellees 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
William R. Hadley 
HADLEY AND HADLEY, L.C. 
Attorney for Appellant 
2225 E Murray Holladay Rd 
Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Utah Oouri of Appcifs 
HAf 0 9 Z 
I. 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this appeal are the Appellant, Pamela A. 
Chaffin (hereinafter Chaffin), and the Appellee, Albertsons, Inc. 
(hereinafter Albertsons). 
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IV. 
JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction in this matter was vested in the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to 78-2-2 (3)(j) Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
Jurisdiction is now properly vested in the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as 
amended), Sec. 78-2-4 (4) and Sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (k) . 
V. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed 
reversible error by granting Albertsons Motion for Summary 
Judgement and dismissing the appellant's Complaint with prejudice. 
Summary Judgement is appropriate when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgement as a matter of law. No deference is given to the trial 
courts determination of whether there are material facts in 
dispute, but a review of the facts and inferences drawn there from 
are viewed in a light most favorable to the losing party. Any 
doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact are resolved in 
favor of the losing party and any legal conclusions are reviewed 
for correctness with no deference given to the trial court. 
Canfield v. Albertsons. 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992). Citations 
omitted. 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
R u l e 56 (c) of t h ' U . R . C i v . F . i s t h e s o l e d e t e r m i n a t i v e 
a u t h o r i t y on app*
 u l . 
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Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent parts; 
"The judgement sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgement as a matter 
of law." 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Chaffin brought this action to recover damages for injuries 
she sustained when she slipped and fell in water left by a floor 
cleaning machine owned by Albertsons in an Albertsons supermarket 
on January 3, 1991 at or about 7:00 a.m. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on December 11, 1991 which 
defendant answered on December 30, 1991. After interrogatories of 
both parties and the depositions taken of plaintiff and Allen 
Morley, an Albertsons1 agent/employee, a Motion For Summary 
Judgement was filed by Albertsons on May 5, 1993. Oral argument 
was heard on June 23, 1993 and at that time Motion For Summary 
Judgement was denied. Defendants renewed their motion on October 
8, 1993 and this was argued on November 5, 1993 and Summary 
Judgement was granted. The order was signed by Judge Richard H. 
Moffat of the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah and 
entered on November 15, 1993. 
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VIII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These facts are largely stated in a light most favorable to 
appellant which is how they must be reviewed by an appellate court 
in reviewing an appeal by the losing party from a Motion For 
Summary Judgement. 
1. That on January 3, 1991, plaintiff drove her automobile 
and parked near the front entrance of the Albertsons Tayorsville 
store located at 1825 West 4700 South sometime between the hours 
of 6:15 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. (Record at 102 and 374). 
2. She entered the market in low heeled pumps and proceeded 
to the bakery near the front of the store. She picked up one bran 
muffin from the bakery and proceeded down another aisle and picked 
up a bottle of soda pop and walked to the back of the store and 
turned left and was walking back to the dairy department. (Record 
at 378 line 23 - 380 line 12, 391 and 455). 
3. She looked up and saw a flooring cleaning machine coming 
out of one aisle. (Record at 380-81). 
4. She saw "^ his machine make a turn and proceed down another 
aisle. (Record at 381). 
5. She took a couple of steps and her feet went out from 
under her. (Record at 381) . 
6. Shp sat there stunned and dazed for a few minutes and when 
she got up she noticed some sudsy water (Record at 383) and a 
puddle of water approximately one foot in diameter. (Record at 
388-90) . 
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7. The floor cleaning machine that left the spot of water was 
purchased and owned by Albertsons. (Record at 343-44) . 
8. That the times and hours of the cleaning of the floors by 
the operator of the machine were dictated by Albertsons. (Record 
at 316-17, 342-43). 
9. That the day was clear and cold with the snow having 
fallen a couple of days before the accident. (Record at 373-374). 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Issues of material fact that arise from reasonable 
inferences to be submitted to a jury are present in this case and 
this case should be remanded to the lower court for a trial. 
2. Chaffin does not have to show that Albertsons had notice 
of the wet spot on the floor in which she slipped and fell if the 
following exceptions to the notice requirement are present in this 
case: 
a. That Albertsons purchased, owned, and controlled the 
floor cleaning machine that left the spot of water. 
b. That Albertsons dictated the time that the floor 
cleaning machine was used with the fact that there was 
a conflict with the floor cleaning machine and stocking 
of shelves by Albertson's employee on the morning in the 
Albertsons store. 
3. The following facts; 
a. That the floor cleaning machine had passed over 
the area immediately before plaintiff slipped and 
fell. 
b. That the water in which plaintiff slipped was 
sudsy. 
c. That the spot on the floor was similar to a spot 
of water one would see after mopping a floor; 
4. Give rise to the reasonable inferences that; 
a. Sudsy water in the back of a food store is not 
a hazard that is normally encountered in a store 
unless placed there by such an article as a floor 
cleaning machine. 
b. That sudsy soapy water normally would not be 
tracked in by a user of a market. 
c. That the floor cleaning machine left the wet 
spot that Chaffin slipped in. 
5. The collective wisdom of a jury is great enough to 
determine and make a factual finding of whether or not there is a 
reasonable inference this water came from the floor cleaning 
machine or was left by a phantom shopper. 
6. Summary judgement was inappropriate in this case and this 
should be remanded to the District Court for trial. 
X. 
ARGUMENT A 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE WHERE THERE ARE GENUINE 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL PACT AND THE MOVING PARTY IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO A JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OP LAW. 
The trial court may render summary judgement only if; 
a. There are no genuine issue of material facts; and 
b. The moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of 
law. U.R.Civ.P. 56 (c) ; Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc. . 814 P.2d 
623 (Ut. App. 1991); Canfield v. Albertsons at 1225. 
Summary judgement is only appropriate when a party makes a 
showing which precludes as a matter of law, the award of relief to 
a non-moving party. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbee Ins. Co. 594 
P.2d 332 (Utah 1979). 
This court, in considering a Motion For Summary Judgement must 
view any doubts or ^ncertainities concerning issues of fact in a 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Silcox v. Skaggs 
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Alpha Beta, Inc., at 624. "Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable 
inferences in determining whether there is a material issue of fact 
which precludes Summary Judgement." Robinson v. IHC, 74 0 P. 2d 2 62, 
263 (Utah App 1987) citations omitted. 
Cases involving negligence are not normally appropriate for 
summary judgment as the question of negligence is a factual issue 
to be determined by a jury. Webster v. Seal, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 
(Utah 1983); Jackson v Dabney, 645 P.2d 613,615 (Utah 1982); 
"Summary judgement should be granted with great caution where 
negligence is alleged." Silcox v. Skaqqs Alpha Beta, Inc. at 1154; 
[Quoting English v Kienke, 774 P. 2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) cert. 
granted 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989)]. 
XI. 
ARGUMENT B 
THAT THE PACTS AND INFERENCES RAISED BY APPELLANT VIEWED IN 
A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO APPELLANT SHOULD PRECLUDE SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined an inference or a 
presumption of fact as lfa logical and reasonable conclusion of the 
existence of a fact in the case, not presented by direct evidence 
as to the existence of the fact itself, but inferred from the 
establishment of other facts from which, by the process of logic 
and reason, based upon common experience, the existence of the 
assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of fact." Wvatt v. 
Baucrhman, 239 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah 1951); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 
878, 881 (Utah 1981). 
The law recognizes that certain facts may be pieced together 
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like a puzzle by the fact finder to reach an ultimate conclusion. 
The Model Utah Jury Instructions recognize this by instruction 2.17 
which states; 
A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
Circumstantial evidence consists of facts or circumstances 
that give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the 
facts sought to be proved. 
In this case, if the evidence had been viewed in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, tht ,. the lower court should have found 
the following: 
FACT NO 1. That the floor cleaning machine had just passed 
over the area where the plaintiff had slipped 
Deposition testimony and exhibits submitted by Chaffin and 
Allen Morley, an agent/employee of Albertsons, clearly show the 
floor cleaning machine had just scrubbed the area in question. 
Morley, the employee running the machine for Albertsons and a 
favorable witners for the appellees stated: 
A: [By Allen Morley] "I was in the process of scrubbing the 
freezer aisles. (See attached diagram.) I was headed towards 
the meat department. As I came to the end of the aisle, I 
looked right and saw Pam Chaffin approximately two or three 
aisles away from me. I proceeded around the corner to go down 
the other side of the freezer aisle. I was about a quarter 
of the way down that aisle when I heard a scream. I stopped 
the machine and turned around and saw Pamela Chaffin on the 
floor." (Record at 321, lines 6-15 and 361, paragraph 2). 
A: [By Mitchel T. Rice] When I came to the end of that 
aisle- it would have been aisle nine. That's the approximate 
position. 
Q: That's when you very first saw her is that where she was? 
A: Yes. 
Qs Where were you? 
A: I would have been right at the end of the aisle. 
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Q: Had you started you started rounding in the aisle yet or 
were you coming to the end of the aisle? 
A: I was coming to the end of the aisle. 
Q: What were you doing at that time? 
A: Just scrubbing the floor. 
Q: With the cleaning machine we referred to earlier? 
A: Correct. (Record at 322 lines 8-21). 
Q: [By Rice] You mentioned further down in the second 
paragraph that you were a fourth of the way down the aisle. 
I take it that you had rounded that aisle and were headed 
north with the cleaning machine the other direction; 
correct? 
A: [By Morley] Correct. 
Q: What aisle is that aisle that you went around? 
A: Eight and nine are the two aisles. 
Q: Eight is which one? 
A: The one on the east. 
Q: So you were headed down north on aisle eight and you were 
about a fourth of the way down when you heard a scream? 
A: Correct. 
Q: You mentioned that you turned around and saw Ms. Chaffin; 
right? 
A: Correct, yes. 
Q: Did you actually just turn around from where you were and 
could see her then or did you have to go back south to see 
her? 
A: I had to back up to see her, stopped the machine and 
just- turned around and take a few steps back. (Record at 323 
line 9 to 324 line 3 and see accompanying Exhibit map at 
Record 3 65 as drawn and submitted by Allen Morley in his 
deposition). 
Chaffin also made the logical conclusion that the floor 
8 
cleaning machine had just cleaned the area where she slipped, 
Q: [By Rice] How do you know it came out from an aisle? 
A: [By Chaffin] Because I saw it come out from an aisle and 
turn and go down the back aisle. Right as it was coming out-
I was walking this way, it was coming out and turned, right 
at that time I just kind of noticed it being there and then 
I went down. (Record at 381, line 8-13). 
Q: [By Rice] How did you know then whether it had gone over 
the spot marked X on the floor? 
A: [By Chaffin] Because he was headed that way and he jumped 
off his machine and came back to me to ask me if I was okay. 
And also the butcher that was working right there in the meat 
department came over at the same time, they both heard me-
I guess I yelled when I slipped. 
Then I just sat there and cried because it hurt so bad. 
But he was headed east. He apparently had already been where 
1 was and was going that way. 
Q: You didn't see the cleaning machine, though, until it was 
approximately six to ten feet from where you were? 
A: Right. 
Q: So you did not see it clean the spot where you marked x? 
A: No. 
Q: You did not actually see it go over that spot? 
A: No. 
Q: Its very possible it may not have gone over that spot 
before you arrived at that spot, is that correct, because you 
did not see it? 
A: It could be possible, but that spot was wet it was sudsy. 
Qs So you are just making the assumption that it did? 
A: Yes. (Record at 382, line 19 to 383, line 18). 
Q: [By Rice] Let me go back just a minute. I just thought 
of something. Why are you assuming that the cleaning machine 
had just come, had just come out from one of the aisles? 
A: [By Chaffin] I'm not assuming, it had come out from 
the aisle. 
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Q: Did you see it come out from the aisle? 
A: Yes, it was just turning the corner to go on to the 
back- it was just coming .out from one of these aisles and 
turning the corner to go to the back aisle. 
And a map produced by Allen Morley (Record at 3 65) as part of 
his answer to a third party complaint filed by Albertsons against 
him clearly shows the fact or raises the inference that Morley came 
up aisle nine in using the machine, made a turn down an adjacent 
aisle with the machine while cleaning the floor, heard a scream, 
was able to easily step off his machine and see plaintiff on the 
floor where he had just scrubbed. 
FACT 2. The water was soapy. 
Q: [By Rice] It is very possible that it [the machine] may 
not have gone over that spot before you arrived at the spot, 
is that correct, because you did not see it? 
A: [By Chaffin] It could be possible, but that spot was 
wet, it was sudsy, (Record at 383 lines 12-16). 
FACT 3. The machine used soapy water to clean the floors. 
Q: [By Rice] Could you describe that cleaning machine? 
A: [By Morley] Big, awkward and green. Holds water and 
soap solution in the tank, you would lay it down, pads would 
scrub the floor and the vacuum would pick all the water back 
up. 
Q: So the solution was you say, a water and soap mix of 
some sort? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And it would distribute that on the floor somehow then 
there were pads that would actually buff the floor, clean the 
floor? 
A: Yes. (Record at 309, lines 10-20). 
FACT 4. That the wet spot was similar to what one would 
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encounter after mopping a floor. 
Q: [By Rice] I think you already mentioned this. Again tell 
me what caused you to fall? 
A; [By Chaffin] What I think caused me to fall? 
Q: Yes. 
A: I think the floor was wet. 
Q: So a wet spot on the floor? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you notice that wet spot before you fell? 
A: No. 
Q: When did you see the wet spot? 
A: When both men took me under my arms and lifted me off the 
floor and I was standing there and I looked down and the floor 
was wet. 
Q: Could you describe that a little bit for me I know wet 
spot pretty much says it all but how large was the wet spot? 
A: It wasn't very big and it wasn't a solid spot. I was like 
if I- mopped my floor in the kitchen and it dries in spots, 
Q: Streaks? 
A: Spots, it will be dry and wet and dry and wet all over in 
little spots and that's the way it was. 
Q: Not one large pool or one large spot? 
A: It was one spot, in other words around it was not all wet. 
It was one spot. 
Q: How big was the one spot? 
A: Probably 18 inches by 18 inches or something. 
Q: Circular? 
A: Yes or 12 inches- just-
Q: Circular? 
A: Yes, just a round spot. 
11 
Q: So maybe a foot? 
A: Yes. This is approximate. All I remember is I looked 
down and the floor was wet where I was. (Record at 3 88, line 
25 to 390, line 8). 
FACT 5. That it had not rained or snowed for a few days prior 
to the accident. 
Q: [By Rice] Do you recall if there was ice or snow on the 
ground outside in the parking lot? 
A: [By Chaffin] There wasn't. In fact it had snowed days 
before, I believe. There was snow out, you know, like on the 
ground. But I pulled right next to the store, in fact right 
in front of the door and there was- it was dry. (Record at 
374 lines 1-6). 
FACT 6. That plaintiff was wearing low heeled leather soled 
shoes and she did not track in water herself. 
Q: [By Rice] Was there snow or ice in other parts of the 
parking lot? 
A: Yes. 
Q: But not where you walked? 
A: Right. (Record at 374, lines 7 to 11). 
Q: What type of shoes were you wearing at the time? 
A: Black leather flats. (Record at 391, lines 5-6). 
Q: Were they dress type shoes for work that you would 
wear to work? 
A: Yes. They were just black leather flats, like dress 
flats. (Record at 391, line 16 to 19). 
Q: [By William R. Hadley] Did you cause any water to be on 
the floor? 
A: [By Chaffin] Did I cause? 
Q: Yes. 
A: No, unless it was my tears. No I didn't. (Record at 449, 
lines 21 to 24) . 
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These are facts established by the depositions and exhibits 
on Record that raise inferences that should preclude summary 
judgement. 
In Wyatt v. Baughman, supra, the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
in length the definition of and use of presumptions of fact, 
inferences and their effects on burden of proof. Baughman involved 
a case of a bailor whose property was damaged while in possession 
of a bailee. A fire occurred with no proof of how it started„ The 
bailed goods were destroyed and plaintiff had shown a prima facie 
case by; a. the bailment, and b. failure to return, or damage to 
the goods. The court in accepting the minority rule stated that 
when a bailor in such case presents the facts of the bailment and 
failure to return the property then an inference of negligence 
arises that must be presented to a jury. The defendant/ bailee/ 
appellee in such a case would then have the burden of persuasion 
shifted to their side. 
The court in accepting the minority rule stated; 
"That the question was for the jury where it could not be said 
as a matter of law that the explanation for the mishap was so 
satisfactory or complete as to overcome the INFERENCE OF 
NEGLIGENCE which the event bespeaks." (Emphasis by Court) 
Further; 
"THAT THE QUESTION IS A FACTUAL ONE FOR THE JURY UNLESS THERE 
IS UNCONTRADICTED, POSITIVE AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE ONE WAY OR 
THE OTHER THAT NEGLIGENCE DID OR [DID NOT] EXIST WHICH WOULD 
ENABLE THE COURT TO DIRECT A VERDICT." Wyatt at 196-97. 
(Emphasis by court). 
Thus, in this case Ms. Chaff in has placed an inference or 
presumption of fact to light based upon the known facts that should 
13 
be viewed most favorably for her. These include the machine going 
over the floor immediately prior to her slipping, her slipping in 
the area, her noting sudsy water, the machine distributing soapy 
water and Chaffin's absence of negligence. 
These facts give rise to the inferences that; 
1. The soapy water was distributed on the floor by the 
cleaning machine owned by Albertsons. 
2. Soapy water is normally not found in an area of the store 
as described by the parties unless it was left by such a cleaning 
machine with the above facts. 
3. Based upon the time, location of the wet spot and the 
description of the wet spot in the store immediately prior to the 
accident the jury could conclude one of two sources left the spot 
and those are; a. the machine left the wet spot, or b. a phantom 
shopper with soap on their shoes left the wet spot in the back of 
the store. 
This case is similar to Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, supra, 
decided by this court in July of 1991. The facts of that case 
involved a cart loaded with ice bags on July 3, 1988. The 
appellant was walking in the store and slipped in an unseen spot 
of water injuring herself. She then looked up and saw spots of 
water leading to the dripping bags of ice. A witness for appellant 
also saw the spots of water. Based upon the facts, the court 
stated that an inference was raised by the appellant and said in 
reversing Judge Richard Moffat: 
"It is for the jury to decide even as only a matter of 
inference whether one of defendant's employees created the 
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risk of harm or whether a phantom shopper, having to move 
merchandise about the store in a cart intended only for the 
use of store personal was responsible for plaintiff's 
injuries." Silcox at 625. 
In Silcox, this court relied upon Campbell v. Safeway Stores 
Incorporated for its rationale in reversing a defendants judgement 
notwithstanding the verdict for the plaintiff. Campbell involved 
a small box left in an aisle of a grocery store that plaintiff 
tripped over sustaining bodily injuries. The court stated in their 
decision the question that this appellant would raise to a jury and 
that is; 
"From these facts and inferences that can be drawn from them 
[could] the jury reasonably believe that was a greater 
probability that store employees left the box where it was 
than that a customer or stranger did [?]" Campbell vs. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 388 P.2d 409 at 411 (Utah 1964)." 
Thus, in this case a jury is in a unique position to hear 
testimony of the plaintiff, defendant's employee who was running 
the machine and the defendant's store manager and meat department 
manager about the facts of this case and, 
"Based upon the presented facts, by a process of logic and 
reason, and upon common experience, the existence of the 
assumed fact may be concluded [or not] by the trier of fact." 
Wyatt at 198. 
This may be a close call for a jury just as it was for Judge Moffat 
who stated; 
"Well, I understand that— your position thoroughly, and 
believe me, I' 7e been reversed on— on cases like this 
before, and I suppose it's, you know, it'll con— it'll happen 
again in the future; but by the same token, I just don't 
think— and it's just a matter of judgement, it's your 
judgement as ai, linst— against mine, I just don't think that 
you can stretch it that far. I don't think that you can allow 
a jury to make that much of a— speculative decision as to 
where that water came from." (Record at 294, lines 14-22). 
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These facts taken together as a whole create a question of 
fact that prevents summary judgement. With the unique collective 
wisdom of the jury, they would be in the best position to render 
or not for plaintiff and this is clearly a question that is 
suitable for a jury. 
XII. 
ARGUMENT C 
A PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT DOES NOT NEED TO ESTABLISH NOTICE IF 
THE CONDITION WAS CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANT STOREOWNER. 
Albertsons main thrust of their argument by motion and 
memorandum was; 
"Albertsons Motion for Summary should be granted because 
Albertsons had no notice, actual or constructive of the 
alleged wetness of the floor which allegedly caused 
plaintiff's fall." 
They then go on to state that Summary Judgement was 
appropriate because there was no evidence that Albertsons either 
knew of the substance on the floor which allegedly caused the 
plaintiff's fall or that they breached their duty of reasonable 
care in failing to discover the condition. The order granting 
Summary Judgement simply stated that Summary Judgement was granted 
based upon these arguments. 
However, under Utah law as it has evolved over the years no 
notice is required if the defendant created the condition that 
caused the accident. In Silcox v. Skaggs, the court stated, "the 
variant of this rule, however, is that *if the condition or defect 
was created by the defendant himself or his agent or employee, the 
notice requirement does not apply.'" Silcox at 624. Citations 
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omitted. 
With the court looking at the inferences raised by the 
appellant most favorably, it can then be shown that the machine in 
question was owned and purchased by Albertsons and the hours the 
floors were cleaned were essentially dictated by Albertsons. Thus, 
no notice to Albertsons of the dangerous condition is required to 
be shown. 
The deposition of Allen Morley, agent/employee of Albertsons, 
stated; 
Q: [By Hadley] You say you purchased the machine yourself 
back in what month? 
A: [By Morley] Well, I purchased the company in March of 
1990. 
Q: And was the machine that you normally used to clean the 
store was that part of the company? 
A: Albertsons supplies the scrubbing machine. 
Q: Did Albertsons show you how to use the scrubbing machine? 
A: Like I stated I picked up the machine from a dealership 
here in Salt Lake and their sales people and their maintenance 
people showed me how to run it. 
Q: Who purchased the machine? 
A: Albertsons did. 
Q: Albertsons did? 
A: Yes. (Record at 343 line 21, 344 line 16). 
There is also an inference that Albertsons dictated the times 
the floors were cleaned depending on the other jobs being performed 
in the store. 
Q: [By Rice] When do you usually run the cleaning machine 
along that south aisle? 
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A: [By Morley] Well, generally on freight nights when I 
clean the perimeter of the store, the first thing I would 
clean would be up front, in front well north of the check 
stands, the very front of the store, and then run just an 
oval, circular pattern around the whole store. 
Q: So you cleaned all the outside aisles of the store 
first then you weaved in and out of the other aisle; is that 
safe to say? 
A: On a complete night I would do all the aisles first 
and then I'd run the complete thing. (Record at 342 line 12-
23) . 
A: [By Morley] It would depend. If it was a freight night, 
I wouldn't go into the store until approximately 3:00 in the 
morning. On any other night I would be in there around 11:00 
p.m. 
Q: [By Rice] Do you know whether January 3rd was a freight 
night? Do you know what time you would have arrived at the 
store? 
A: On that particular night I would have arrived at 
approximately three, three thrity. It was a freight night. 
(Record 316 line 5 to 120). 
Thus, we have the defendant owning the machine and even 
dictating or limiting times that Morley could perform his job in 
the store. 
Further, Albertsons must take responsibility for this quasi-
employee as there was no written contract indicating a contractor 
status entered into between Morley and Albertsons. 
Q: [By Rice] What type of agreement did you have with Rob? 
A: [By Morley] It was just a verbal agreement. I'd come in 
and do the floors, that was it. 
Q: There was nothing in writing? 
A: Nothing. (Record at 307 line 24 to 308 line 3). 
Q: Was there anything at all mentioned about what would 
happen or responsibilities of the parties if there was any 
type of accident or injury? 
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A: Nothing like that never came up. 
Q: There was no mention of that at all? 
A: No. 
Q: Is that a no? 
A: No there wasn't, I'm sorry. (Record at 308 line 23 to 309 
line 5). 
Qs [By Hadley] I'm going to show you what's marked exhibit 
two, can you read the top line? 
A: [By Morley] This agreement is made the blank day of 
November 1990 by and between Albertsons, Inc., a Delaware 
Corporation, and Morley Janitorial Service. 
Q: What is the very top, what is the logo and wording 
there? 
A: The Albertsons Janitorial or other services agreement. 
Q: Down on the bottom there is a signature under contractor, 
do you recognize that signature? 
A: It's Kelly Morley, that's my brother. 
Q: Have you ever seen a copy of this contract before? 
A: Not until I received the rummons, no, that's the first 
I have seen of this. (Record at 352, lines 1 to 15). 
Q: Did you ever sign one of these with Albertsons? 
A: I don't remember signing one, no as far as I know this 
is the first time I have seen it, when I got the summons 
that's the first I remember seeing one of these. (Record at 
353, lines 1 to 5). 
Q: Is he simply an employee of yours? 
A: Correct. 
Ql You gave him no authority to enter into such an 
agreement? 
A: No. (Record at 356 line 24 to 357 line 3). 
Thus, Summary Judgement upon in the matter of notice was 
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inappropriate and this should be remanded back to the District 
Court for trial. 
XIII. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The defendants motion fails to demonstrate the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact and may bring in the issue of 
credibility of the witnesses for the defendant. The defendant has 
not shown that plaintiff has failed to establish sufficient 
evidence of an essential element of its claim. Clearly the 
deposition and exhibits of Allen Morley, the employee of 
Albertsons, constitutes relevant and admissible evidence to 
establish at the least a question of negligence and causation. 
Although much of the evidence in this case is circumstantial it is 
sufficient to satisfy the evidentiary standard imposed by the 
substantive law. If the court views the plaintiff's evidence in 
a light most favorable to her, the inferences drawn therefrom would 
clearly meet the "preponderance of evidence test." Based upon 
testimony and facts and inferences raised by the appellant, if this 
case should go to trial the question to be presented to a jury 
would be, "Is the probability greater than not that the floor 
cleaning machine left this puddle of soapy water versus an unknown 
phantom shopper who tracked in a foreign substance all the way to 
the back of this grocery store?" Based upon the following, the 
District Court ruling granting Summary Judgement was incorrect and 
should be reversed and the matter remanded for trial on the merits. 
1994. DATED t h i s 7 day of / A / y 
faf/sb's, ( j&U(fr-
WILLIAM R. HADLEY 
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SILCOX v. SKAGGS ALPHA BETA, INC. Utah 623 
Cite a* 814 ?2d 623 (Utah App. 1991) 
comfortable style, thus promoting, not in- 1. Negligence <3=>136(14) 
hibiting "ping-pong" custody. The trial Negligence issues become questions of 
court clearly did not abuse its discretion in law only when facts are undisputed and 
refusing to do so. only one conclusion can be drawn from 
them. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly included evi-
dence as to the children's best interest in 
holding that there had been no substantial 
change in circumstances which would justi-
fy modification of the custody portion of 
the original divorce decree. Accordingly, 
we affirm. 
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
Pat SILCOX, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SKAGGS ALPHA BETA, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and Frank Lewis, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 910041-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 3, 1991. 
Store customer brought action against 
owners to recover from injuries caused by 
slip and fall. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, J., en-
tered summary judgment in favor of own-
ers. Customer appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Jackson, J., held that whether wa-
ter in which store customer slipped and fell 
came from bags of ice on merchandise cart 
left in aisle by store employees or whether 
phantom shopper was responsible for the 
slip and fall were questions of fact preclud-
ing summary judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
814P.2C*—15 
2. Negligence <3=*48 
Mere presence of slippery spot on floor 
does not in and of itself establish negli-
gence; proof that slippery or wet sub-
stance was on floor does not, without more, 
establish that defendant knew or should 
have known of the condition. 
3. Judgment <s=>181(33) 
Whether water in which store custom-
er slipped and fell came from bags of ice on 
merchandise cart left in aisle by store em-
ployees or whether phantom shopper was 
responsible for the slip and fall were ques-
tions of fact precluding summary judg-
ment. 
4. Judgment <£=>185(2) 
Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable 
inferences in determining whether there is 
material issue of fact which precludes sum-
mary judgment against plaintiff. 
Matt Biljanic, Midvale, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Philip R. Fishier and Stephen J. Trayner, 
Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dants and appellees. 
Before GARFF, JACKSON and ORME, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Plaintiff Pat Silcox appeals from the trial 
court's grant of, defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. We reverse. 
Summary judgment can be granted when 
no genuine issue of material fact exists, 
and the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 
56(c); see also Perkins v. Great-West Life 
Assurance Co., Nos. 890732-CA, 890733-
CA, — P.2d , (Utah App. June 
21, 1991); Robinson v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 263 (Utah 
624 Utah 814 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
App.1987). "Any doubts or uncertainties 
concerning issues of fact must be con-
strued in favor of the party opposing sum-
mary judgment." Robinson, 740 P.2d at 
263 (citations omitted). 
FACTS 
On July 3, 1988, plaintiff, her friend 
Phyllis Peebles, and plaintiffs two grand-
children entered defendants' store, located 
at 7800 Redwood Road, in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. As plaintiff proceeded down a dry 
goods aisle, she slipped and fell. Plaintiff 
stated in her deposition that she saw noth-
ing on the floor before she fell. Peebles, 
who was with plaintiff when the Occident 
occurred, also stated in her deposition that 
prior to plaintiffs fall, she did not see 
anything on the floor which may have 
caused the fall. However, when she bent 
down to help plaintiff up from the floor, 
Peebles noticed the floor was wet. Peebles 
testified that after plaintiff had been re-
moved from the area where the accident 
occurred, Peebles noticed a cart with bags 
which contained melting ice. The cart was 
of the type typically used to transport mer-
chandise to be stocked, and was located 
approximately 115 feet from where plain-
tiff fell. According to Peebles, there were 
spots of water from where the cart was 
located leading back to the aisle where 
plaintiff fell. Peebles told one of the 
store's employees that she believed the 
bags of melting ice were the source of the 
water on the floor. 
Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence, 
alleging that the water on the floor caused 
her fall. Defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment, and plaintiff opposed 
the motion, claiming her deposition and the 
deposition and affidavit of Peebles created 
genuine issues of material fact. The trial 
court granted defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment, from which plaintiff ap-
peals. 
ANALYSIS 
[1] While the Utah Supreme Court has 
held "in 'slip and fall' cases that property 
owners are not insurers of the safety of 
those who come upon their premises," 
Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 
182, 183 (Utah 1991) (citing Martin v. Safe-
way Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 
1977) and Long v. Smith Food King Store, 
531 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1973)), "summary 
judgment should be granted with great 
caution where negligence is alleged." 
English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 
(Utah App.) (citation omitted), cert grant-
ed, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). Such issues 
become questions of law only when the 
facts are undisputed and only one conclu-
sion can be drawn from them. See id. 
The law is well settled in this state that to 
hold an owner or possessor of land liable 
for injuries to an invitee, it must be shown 
that the owner or occupier knew, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have 
known, of the existence of a dangerous 
condition. See Martin, 565 P.2d at 1140; 
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farm,, Inc., 538 
P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975); Long, 531 P.2d 
at 361. The variant of this rule, however, 
is "that if the condition or defect was cre-
ated by the defendant himself or his agents 
or employees, the notice requirement does 
not apply." Long, 531 P.2d at 361; see 
also Allen, 538 P.2d at 178 (Maughan, J., 
dissenting); Koer v. May fair Mkts., 19 
Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, 569 (1967); 
Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 15 Utah 
2d 113, 388 P.2d 409, 410 (1964). 
[2,3] The mere presence of a slippery 
spot on a floor does not in and of itself 
establish negligence. This condition may 
arise in any place of business for any num-
ber of reasons. Proof that a slippery or 
wet substance was on a floor, does not, 
without more, establish that defendant 
knew or should have known of the condi-
tion. See generally Allen, 538 P.2d at 176; 
Koer, 431 P.2d at 569. However, in the 
present case, where the cart on which the 
ice was stacked was a cart of the type 
typically used by store employees to move 
cases of goods, rather than a shopping cart 
of the type ordinarily used by customers, 
there is a question as to whether the defen-
dants, through one of the store's employ-
ees, created the foreseeable risk of harm. 
An inference could readily be drawn by the 
jury that the water in which plaintiff fell 
SILCOX v. SKAGGS ALPHA BETA, INC. 
Cite M 814 PJ2d 623 (Utah App. 1991) 
came from the bags of ice on the cart left of law, the evidence 
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in the aisle by store employees. Plaintiff 
has introduced evidence from the deposi-
tion of Peebles which raises such an infer-
ence. It is for the jury to decide, even if 
only as matter of inference, whether one of 
defendants' employees created the risk of 
harm, or whether a phantom shopper, giv-
en to moving merchandise about the store 
on a cart intended only for the use of store 
personnel, was responsible for plaintiffs 
injuries. 
This case is governed by Campbell, and 
not, as defendant suggests, by Lindsay v. 
Eccles Hotel Co., 3 UtaTi 2d 364, 284 P.2d 
477 (1955). In Campbell, the supreme 
court set aside the judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict for the defendant, stating 
that from the facts and inferences, "the 
jury could reasonably believe that there 
was a greater probability that store em-
ployees left the box [which plaintiff had 
fallen over in defendant's store] where it 
was than that a customer or stranger did." 
Campbell, 388 P.2d at 411. In Lindsay, on 
the other hand, the supreme court affirmed 
the trial court's judgment that as a matter 
was insufficient to 
present a jury question as to defendant's 
negligence, where plaintiff sustained inju-
ries as a result of a slip and fall on defen-
dant's coffee shop floor caused by water 
which could have been spilled as easily by a 
customer as by an employee. Lindsay, 284 
P.2d at 478. 
[4] Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable 
inferences in determining whether there is 
a material issue of fact which precludes 
summary judgment. See Robinson, 740 
P.2d at 263 (citations omitted). The sum-
mary judgment against plaintiff is there-
fore reversed and the case remanded to the 
trial court for trial or such other proceed-
ings as may be appropriate. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
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violated because (1) Officer Slagowski 
lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to 
detain him beyond the initial purposes of 
the stop for a traffic violation, and (2) he 
did not voluntarily consent to the search of 
the vehicle.1 
[1,2] The State concedes that Hewitt's 
convictions must be reversed and remanded 
because: (1) Hewitt's nervous behavior was 
insufficient to give Officer Slagowski a rea-
sonable articulable suspicion to detain him 
once the initial purposes of the traffic stop 
were completed, under State v. Robinson, 
797 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah App.1990);2 and 
(2) Hewitt did not voluntarily consent to 
the search of the vehicle, pursuant to 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); and 
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 436-38. According-
ly, Hewitt's convictions are reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion. 
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
J7\ 
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Mary E. CANFIELD, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
ALBERTSONS, INC., Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 910481-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 13, 1992. 
In slip-and-fall action arising out of 
patron's slipping on lettuce leaf in produce 
department of grocery store, the Third Dis-
1. Hewitt also argues that any consent given to 
search the vehicle lacked attentuation from the 
initial stop, making the evidence seized inadmis-
sible, and that article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Ctt . titution requires that his consent to search 
be knowing, as well as voluntary. Because of 
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Richard H 
Moffat, J., granted summary judgment in 
favor of grocer. Plaintiff appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J., held that: 
(1) in action challenging grocer's choice of 
method of operation, it was not necessary 
that plaintiff show that grocer had actual 
or constructive notice of particular danger-
ous condition, i.e., presence of specific let-
tuce leaf that caused fall, and (2) genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether grocer 
acted reasonably in its attempts to protect 
its customers from dangerous condition 
precluded summary judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Negligence <5=>44, 48 
In general, there are two legal theories 
under which store owner may be liable for 
patron's slip and fall: if store owner knew 
or had reason to know of hazardous condi-
tion and reasonable opportunity to remedy 
same; and where store owner, its agents or 
employees create or are responsible for 
dangerous condition. 
2. Negligence <s=>48 
Where store owner chooses method of 
operation where it is reasonably foresee-
able that expectable acts of third parties 
will create dangerous condition, injured 
party need not prove either actual or con-
structive knowledge of specific condition; 
in this type of case, notice is satisfied as 
matter of law because store owner is 
deemed to be informed of dangerous condi-
tion since it adopted method of operation. 
3. Negligence <&=>48 
In slip-and-fall action challenging gro-
cer's choice of method of operation in set-
ting up farmers' pack displays of lettuce 
where it was reasonably foreseeable that 
expectable acts of third parties would cre-
ate dangerous condition, it was not neces-
sary that plaintiff show that grocer had 
actual or constructive notice of particular 
our resolution of the issues above, we need not 
address Hewitt's argument on these issues. 
2. Accord State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 158 
(Utah App.1992); State v. Godina-Luna, 826 
P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App.1992). 
CANFIELD v. ALBERTSONS, INC. 
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dangerous condition, 1 e , presence of spe-
cific lettuce leaf that allegedly caused her 
fall 
4. Judgment <S^181(33) 
Genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether grocer took reasonable precau-
tions to protect customers against danger-
ous condition it created by setting up farm-
ers' pack displays of lettuce precluded sum-
mary judgment in favor of grocer in shp-
and fall action 
Roy G Haslam and Valden P Living-
ston, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appel-
lant 
Stephen G Morgan, Darwin C Hansen, 
and Randall D Lund, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellee 
Before BENCH, JACKSON and ORME, 
JJ 
OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge 
Plaintiff Mary Canfield appeals from the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Albertsons We reverse and re-
mand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion 
FACTS 
Ms Canfield alleges she slipped and fell 
on a lettuce leaf while walking through the 
produce department of an Albertsons store 
Albertsons displayed some of its lettuce in 
what is known as a "farmer's pack dis-
play " In such a display, lettuce is left in 
the boxes in which it arrives from the farm 
without the damaged or wilted outer leaves 
having been removed As a result, custom-
ers often remove and discard the outer 
leaves from heads of lettuce they intend to 
purchase Albertsons was aware of this 
problem and placed empty boxes around 
the farmer's pack display in which custom-
ers could place the discarded leaves Al-
bertsons also indicated that it patrolled and 
1 For purposes of the summary judgment mo 
tion the parties and the trial court assumed that 
Ms Canfield slipped and fell on a lettuce leaf 
cleaned the produce section, including the 
area around the lettuce display, on a regu-
lar basis 
Ms Canfield sustained injuries from her 
fall and sued Albertsons to recover for her 
damages She asserted that it was com-
mon for lettuce leaves to be on the floor 
around the display, despite Albertsons's ef-
forts 
Albertsons brought a motion for sum-
mary judgment The trial court granted 
the motion, holding that Ms Canfield failed 
to meet her burden of showing that Albert-
sons had either actual or constructive no 
tice of the particular lettuce leaf upon 
which she slipped and fell] The court fur-
ther held, as a matter of law, that Albert-
sons acted reasonably in protecting its pa 
trons against any hazard presented by the 
farmer's pack display 
ISSUES 
Ms Canfield argues on appeal that the 
trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment because genuine issues of fact exist-
ed which should have precluded summary 
judgment In addition, Ms Canfield ar-
gues that the trial court erroneously inter-
preted Utah law as requiring her to show 
that Albertsons had notice of the specific 
lettuce leaf upon which she slipped and fell 
Finally, Ms Canfield argues that the trial 
court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, 
that Albertsons acted reasonably in at-
tempting to eliminate the hazard presented 
by the lettuce display We conclude that 
the trial court erred in interpreting the law, 
and in ruling, as a matter of law, that 
jflbertsons took reasonable precautions to 
protect its customers 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law Larson v Over-
land Thrift and Loan, 818 P 2d 1316, 1319 
(Utah App 1991), cert denied, 832 P 2d 476 
We therefore also assume that Ms Canfield 
slipped and fell on a lettuce leaf However on 
remand this may be a contested factual issue 
1226 Utah 841 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
(Utah 1992). In deciding whether the trial 
court correctly determined that there were 
no genuine issues of material fact, we do 
not defer to the trial court's determination 
of whether there are material facts in dis-
pute, but review the facts and inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favor-
able to the losing party. Id. Any doubts 
or uncertainties concerning issues of fact 
are resolved in favor of the losing party. 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 263 (Utah App.1987). 
Ms. Canfield also challenges the trial 
court's legal conclusions which we review 
for correctness, giving no deference to the 
trial court. Larson, 818 P.2d at 1319. 
ANALYSIS 
Ms. Canfield argues that she is not re-
quired to show that Albertsons had notice 
of the specific lettuce leaf upon which she 
slipped and fell if Albertsons created the 
dangerous condition. We agree. 
We begin our analysis with the general 
proposition that "property owners are not 
insurers of the safety of those who come 
upon their premises." Silcox v. Skaggs 
Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 
App.1991). Summary judgment, however, 
should be granted with extreme caution 
where the negligence of the property own-
er is alleged. Id. Issues involved in negli-
gence "become questions of law only when 
the facts are undisputed and only one con-
clusion can be drawn from them." Id. 
[1] In general, there are two legal theo-
ries under which a storeowner may be 
found negligent and held liable for a pa-
tron's injuries in a "slip and fall" case in 
Utah. The first theory involves situations 
where there is a temporary or transient 
hazard within the store that was not creat-
ed by the storeowner, its agents, or em-
ployees. Under this theory, in order to 
find a storeowner negligent, it must be 
shown that the storeowner "knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have 
known, of any hazardous condition and had 
a reasonable opportunity to remedy the 
same." Koer v. May fair Markets, 19 Utah 
2d 339, 343, 431 P.2d 566, 569 (1967); ac-
cord Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 
Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975); Long 
v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360, 
361 (Utah 1973); Silcox, 814 P.2d at 624. 
The second theory, which governs the 
case before us, involves situations where 
the storeowner, its agents, or employees 
create or are responsible for the dangerous 
condition. Under this theory, a plaintiff 
does not need to establish notice since a 
storeowner is deemed to have notice of the 
dangerous condition it creates. Long, 531 
P.2<jl at 361-62 (referring to this theory as a 
"variant" of the first theory); accord 
Koer, 431 P.2d at 569; Silcox, 814 P.2d at 
624. It is here that the trial court has 
misinterpreted the law by applying the 
analysis governing the first theory, rather 
than the analysis governing the second the-
ory, which is the theory at issue. 
This second theory usually requires that 
the storeowner, its agents, or employees 
actually create the condition or defect that 
results in an injury to a patron. However, 
there is no logical distinction between a 
situation in which the storeowner directly 
creates the condition or defect, and where 
the storeowner's method of operation cre-
ates a situation where it is reasonably fore-
seeable that the expectable acts of third 
parties will create a dangerous condition or 
defect. See De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., 
5 Utah 2d 116, 121, 297 P.2d 898, 901 (1956) 
("a negligent act may be one which 'creates 
a situation which involves an unreasonable 
risk to another because of the expectable 
action of the other [or] a third person' ") 
(quoting Restatement of Torts, 11 302(b)). 
[2] We therefore reiterate the rule set 
forth in De Weese, that where the store-
owner chooses a method of operation 
where it is reasonably foreseeable that the 
expectable acts of third parties will create 
a dangerous condition, an injured party 
need not prove either actual or constructive 
knowledge of the specific condition. Id. at 
901. In this type of case, notice is satisfied 
as a matter of law because the storeowner 
is deemed to be informed of the dangerous 
condition since it adopted the method of 
operation. See generally Thomason v. 
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 413 
CANFIELD v. ALBERTSONS, INC. 
Cite M 841 P~2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992) 
Utah 1227 
F.2d 51, 52 (4th Cir.1969). "To relieve the 
plaintiff of the requirement of proving ac-
tual or constructive notice in such instances 
is to effect a more equitable balance in 
regard to the burdens of proof." Maugeri 
v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 357 
F.2d 202, 203 (3d Cir.1966) (quoting Bozzo 
v. Vornado, 42 N.J. 355, 200 A.2d 777 
(1964)). 
[3] In this case, Ms. Canfield alleges 
that she slipped on a lettuce leaf on the 
floor near a display of farmer's pack let-
tuce. Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to Ms. Canfield, Albertsons chose 
a method of displaying and offering lettuce 
for sale where it was expected that third 
parties would remove and discard the outer 
leaves from heads of lettuce they intended 
to purchase. It was reasonably foresee-
able that under this method of operation 
some leaves would fall or be dropped on 
the floor by customers thereby creating a 
dangerous condition. Because Albertsons 
chose this method of operation, the ques-
tion of whether Albertsons had notice, ei-
ther actual or constructive, is not relevant. 
The relevant question is whether Albert-
sons took reasonable precautions to protect 
customers against the dangerous condition 
it created. 
[4] The trial court concluded, as a mat-
ter of law, that Albertsons's actions in this 
case, were sufficient to "negate any negli-
gence" on its part. This was error since 
the determination of reasonableness, and 
negligence, lies within the province of the 
jury. "The standard upon which negli-
gence is gauged is that of ordinary, reason-
able care under the circumstances, which 
standard it is peculiarly fitting that juries 
determine." DeWeese, 297 P.2d at 901. 
Questions involving reasonableness and 
negligence "become questions of law only 
when the facts are undisputed and only one 
conclusion can be drawn from them." Sil-
cox, 814 P.2d at 624. 
Given Albertsons's decision to use farm-
er's pack displays, the inquiry therefore 
becomes whether Albertsons did what was 
"reasonably necessary to protect the cus-
tomer from the risk of injury that mode of 
operation is likely to generate." Woller-
man v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. 
426, 221 A.2d 513, 514 (1966). This inquiry 
necessarily focuses on the storeowner's ac-
tions prior to, or contemporary with, the 
creation of the dangerous condition. Each 
determination of whether the protective 
measures taken were reasonable is fact 
sensitive. The circumstances that deter-
mine the reasonableness of the protective 
measures might include "the type and vol-
ume of merchandise, the type of display, 
the floor space used for customer service, 
the nature of customer service, and the 
volume of business." Gonzales v. Winn-
Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 326 So.2d 486, 488 
(La. 1976). In any event, the factfinder 
must determine whether the storeowner's 
vigilance in protecting against a condition 
or hazard was commensurate with the risk 
created by the method of operation. Wol-
lerman, 221 A.2d at 514. 
Albertsons indicated that empty boxes 
were placed around the farmer's pack dis-
play so that customers could discard 
leaves. Further, Albertsons instituted a 
regular schedule for inspecting and clean-
ing the produce section, including the area 
around the lettuce display. Ms. Canfield 
claims that despite Albertsons's efforts, it 
was still common for lettuce leaves to be 
on the floor. Specifically, she challenges 
Albertsons's assertion that it cleaned the 
produce section shortly before her fall. 
She also claims that other stores in the 
industry use non-skid mats around similar 
farmer's pack displays and that Albertsons 
was negligent for not doing likewise. Both 
Ms. Canfield and Albertsons dispute the 
facts gnd inferences presented by the other 
side. Viewing the facts and the inferences 
drawn therefrom in favor of Ms. Canfield, 
we conclude that there was a material issue 
of fact involving the question of whether 
Albertsons took reasonable 'precautions to 
protect its customers from the dangerous 
condition it created. It was therefore error 
for the trial court to grant Albertsons's 
motion for summary judgment. 
In so ruling, we are not passing judg-
ment on whether Albertsons was negli-
gent—it is not our function to weigh the 
evidence. We note only that reasonable 
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minds could differ on the question of 
whether Albertsons took reasonable pre-
cautions to protect its customers. The de-
termination of Albertsons's negligence, if 
any, is therefore necessarily reserved for 
the factfinder. 
We conclude that the trial court misinter-
preted the law. Ms. Canfield is challeng-
ing Albertsons's choice of a method of op-
eration where it was reasonably foresee-
able that the expectable acts of third par-
ties would create a dangerous conditio*. It 
is therefore not necessary that Ms. Can-
field show that Albertsons had actual or 
constructive notice of the particular dan-
gerous condition, i.e., the presence of the 
specific lettuce leaf that allegedly caused 
her fall. We also conclude that the trial 
court erred in determining, as a matter of 
law, that Albertsons acted reasonably in its 
attempts to protect its customers from the 
dangerous condition. This determination is 
fact sensitive and may not be decided as a 
matter of law. 
We reverse the summary judgment and 
remand for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Moises Prado RODRIGUEZ, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 910636-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 13, 1992. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth 
District Court, Juab County, Boyd L. Park, 
J., of possession of cocaine, and he appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, P,J.( 
held that defendant's failure to appeal trial 
court's ruling that defendant lacked stand-
ing to contest search of vehicle constituted 
waiver of defendant's claim on appeal that 
search was unconstitutional. 
1. Searches and Seizures <5=>161 
Standing is threshold question when 
asserting Fourth Amendment rights. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
2. Criminal Law e=>1178 
Drug defendant's failure to appeal tri-
al court's ruling that defendant lacked 
standing to contest search of vehicle consti-
tuted waiver of defendant's claim on appeal 
that search was unconstitutional; unap-
pealed ruling that defendant lacked stand-
ing remained law of case. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
Milton T. Harmon, Nephi, for defendant 
and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of pos-
session of a controlled substance with in-
tent to distribute, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp.1992). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant, a California resident, was 
driving a van on Interstate 15 at 83 miles 
per hour when he was stopped for speed-
ing. He was accompanied by Arnoldo Pa* 
dilla. Defendant provided the trooper with 
a vehicle registration indicating that the 
van was registered to a Noal Reyes. The 
trooper testified that when he asked who 
the van belonged to, they indicated that it 
belonged to "Armando." 
Affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
OAMPBELL v. S A F E W A Y STORES, INCORPORATED 
Cite as 388 I\2d 409 
15 Utah 2d 113 
uuh 409 
Leone C A M P B E L L , Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SAFEWAY STORES, INCORPORATED, 
a corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 9802. 
{Supreme Court of L'tah. 
Jan. 17, VM)A. 
Action against store operator for in-
juries sustained by plaintiff-customer when 
s ) u . |\-11 over a small box in an aisle of the 
M,, r i.. The Thi rd District Court, Salt Lake 
Cuiintv, Aldon J. Anderson, J., g ran ted 
judgment for the defendant notwithstand-
ing a verdict for the plaintiff and the plain-
tiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Crock-
ett, !-, held that questions of negligence and 
contributor)' negligence were (or the jury . 
Order g ran t ing judgment notwithstand-
ing verdict set aside. 
1 L i inod , C. J., dissented. 
I. Negligence £^136(22) 
Whether leaving small box in grocery 
store aisle where people are expected to be 
preoccupied in searching shelves for g ro -
ceries constituted unreasonable risk of h a r m 
to them and was therefore negligence is 
jury question. 
2. Negligence e=^l34(3) 
That grocery store operator 's servants 
placed box in aisle where customer tripped 
over ir cannot be found from speculation 
and conjecture but there must be sound 
basis in evidence from which it can reason-
ably he determined that there is grea ter 
probability that box was left there by em-
ployee than otherwise. 
3. Negligence O I 3 6 ( l 5 ) 
W i n ! h e r t h e r e w a s g r e a t e r p r o b a b i l i t y 
that store employees left small box in aisle 
when- plaintiff-customer tripped over it 
than that customer or s t ranger did was for 
jury. 
4. Negligence C=»I36(27) 
W hether woman of about 60 suffering 
irum Parkinson's disease and having im-
paired eyesight was contributorily negligent 
in fading to see small box over which she 
tripped in grocery store aisle was for jury. 
5. Damages C=>208(l) 
Assessment of damages is something 
peculiarly within prerogat ive of jury and 
court is extremely reluctant to interfere 
with jury judgment in that regard. 
6. Damages C=>I32(I5) 
Award of $14,053.26 in favor of 60-
year-old woman who sustained injuries in-
cluding fracture of neck of femur, as a re-
sult of which her locomotion was perma-
nently impaired was not so beyond reason 
as to require that reviewing court upset it 
by grant ing additur , though she had sus-
tained medical, hospital and related expens-
es of approximately $8,000. 
7. Trial C^I43 
Whenever there is genuine dispute as 
to issues of fact, parties a rc entitled to have 
it submitted to and settled by jury, and 
when parties have had full and fair op-
portunity to present their cause and jury 
has rendered its verdict, it should not be 
interfered with unless there appears some 
compelling reason why justice demands that 
it be done. 
Shirley P. Jones, Jr., G. Kenneth Hand-
ley, Jr., Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Ray, Ouinncy & Ncbekcr, Marvin J. 
Bertoch, L. Ridd Larson, Salt Lake City, 
for respondent. 
C R O C K E T T , Justice. 
PlaiiftiiT, Mrs. Leone. Campbell, sued for 
injuries suffered when she tripped ami fell 
over a small cardboard box m an aisle of 
the defendant 's supermarket located at 4th 
South and Ninth Last in Salt Lake City. 
A jury found a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff for $14,053.26. Subsequently the 
trial court granted defendant 's motion for 
judgment notwi ths tanding the verdict. 
Plaintiff appeals seeking (1) reversal of 
that ruling and reinstatement of the verdict, 
and (2) an additur to the verdict, or m the 
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al ternat ive, a new trial on the issues of 
damages only. 
Plaintiff is a woman of about 60, stated 
to be "of advanced y e a r s / ' a charac te r iza-
tion which is, of course, ent irely dependent 
upon one's point of view. She had for 
some years been in ill heal th , suffering from 
Parkinson 's Disease. A t the t ime of the 
accident she was on some new medicat ion 
which had great ly improved her condition, 
so that she was able to move about quite 
well. H e r eyesight was also impaired : she 
had a fully developed ca t a rac t in the r ight 
eye, so that her vision wras reduced to light 
perception only ; a considerable degree of 
nears ightedness in the left eye, for which 
she normally used glasses. But at the time 
of this incident she was not wear ing them. 
Mrs . Campbell resided with her adult 
daughter , Jeanne . As was thei r custom, 
they went to the defendant ' s store to do 
their weekly shopping at about 8 p. m. on 
Fr iday evening, when it was not very busy. 
As they browsed along the aisles, selecting 
desired items, Jeanne pushed the grocery 
car t and plaintiff followed along. Jus t 
prior to this accident they proceeded east-
ward to the end of one aisle and turned left 
to go wes tward into the nex t one, with 
Jeanne and the car t slightly ahead of plain-
tiff, the lat ter searching the shelves for a 
part icular brand of dog food. W h e n they 
had proceeded but a few feet, plaintiff 
tripped over a small empty ca rdboard box 
in the aisle, precipi ta t ing h e r to the floor 
and causing what she charac te r ized as " ter-
rific pain." Jeanne assisted her in get t ing 
to the £ar. She continued to suffer ex t reme 
pain, and the nex t evening in a r i s ing from 
her chair, she felt something " s n a p " in her 
hip. Upon being taken to the hospital , X -
rays revealed that she had sustained a 
fracture of the neck of the femur. Omit-
t ing unnecessary detail, it is sufficient to 
say that a l though the plaintiff was obliged 
to undergo surgery several t imes, it proved 
impossible to get a good union of the bone. 
I. Sot Ilillyunl v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 
Utah 2d 143, 2H3 P.2d 2S7. 
Because of the crippling of the hip joint, 
her locomotion is permanent ly impaired. 
Defendant's Negligence 
[1] Tt is hardly open to question that 
reasonable minds could believe that the 
leaving oi such a box in the aisle, where 
people are expected to be preoccupied in 
searching the shelves for grocer ies , would 
create a hazard exposing o thers to an un-
reasonable risk of harm. 1 T h a t danger to 
customers is reasonably to be apprehended 
from such a circumstance is shown by the 
defendant 's store manager , Mr. Douglas 
VVilley, who testified to the care he person-
ally observed and urged upon his employees 
to keep the aisles free of boxes and mer-
chandise in the interest of safety. 
[2, 3] A more crucial question is wheth-
er the evidence will justify a finding that 
the defendant ' s servants placed the box 
there. Defendant is war ran ted in insisting 
that this fact cannot be found from specula-
tion and conjecture, but there must be a 
sound basis in the evidence from which it 
can reasonably be determined that there is 
a greater probability that the box was left 
there by an employee than otherwise." 
Facts shown by the evidence which might 
be regarded as having a significant bearing 
on that question are t he se : tha t this was 
quite a small box; only six inches high, by 
one foot wide and a foot and a half long; 
tha t it was of a type which some of the 
canned goods come in which the clerks re-
move and place on the shelves ; tha t it 
would be quite unusual for a cus tomer to be 
using a cardboard box in the merchandise 
a r e a ; and even more so to be us ing one of 
this small s ize; that cus tomers usually do 
not do so, but use shopping car t s for 
ga ther ing their purchases, then go through 
the checks tands ; that the checkers place 
the items purchased in large sacks, or in 
some instances in boxes ; if boxes a r e used 
for this purpose, they are usually larger 
than the box referred to. F r o m these facts, 
and inferences that can be drawm from 
2. Alvnrado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 1G, 2GS P. 
2d 98G. 
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them, the jury could reasonably believe that 
there was a greater probability that store 
employees left the box where it was than 
that a customer or stranger did. This case 
is distinguishable from Lindsey v. Eccles 
Hotel.3 There the plaintiff slipped on 
water spilled on the floor of a cafe. Both 
employees and customers had access to the 
water, so it would have involved mere 
conjecture as to who spilled it. 
The foregoing conclusion renders it un-
necessary for us to be critically concerned 
with plaintiff's further argument that the 
issue of defendant's negligence was proper-
ly submitted because the checker at the end 
of the aisle had a clear view of the area in 
question for a sufficient interval of time 
that the checker could have seen the box 
and removed it. But due to the dispute 
between the parties about it, it appears 
likely that a jury question existed as to that 
matter also. 
Plaintiff's Contributory Negligence 
[4] C^ Ve agree that ordinarily one is 
guilty of contributory negligence which will 
preclude recovery if she fails to see and 
give heed to a danger which is plain to be 
seen.4 However, as we have held on a 
number of occasions, this rule is not strictly 
applicable where there are extenuating cir-
cumstances which impair the ability to see 
the hazard.5 They were present in the 
instant case in that plaintiff's daughter was 
going just ahead of her with the grocery 
cart; and that plaintiff was preoccupied in 
searching the shelves for certain merchan-
dise :^; There is the further fact that it 
would not be unreasonable for one to pro-
ceed with at least some degree of assurance 
that these aisles are clear of impedimenta. 
JJnder such circumstances, it is our opinion 
that a jury question existed as to whether 
3. 3 Utah 2d 304, 284 P.2d 477. 
4. Pulley v. Mid-Western Dairy, SO Utah 
331, 15 P.2d 309; Clark v. Union Pacific 
R. R., 70 Utah 29, 257 P. 1050. 
5. Nee discussion in Federated Milk Pro-
ducers v. Statewide Plumb. & Htg., 11 
Utah 2d 295, 358 P.2d 348 and casea there-
in cited. 
the plaintiff was observing the standard of 
care of an ordinary, reasonable and prudent 
person for her own safetyT} 
Inadequacy of Damages 
In support of her contention that the 
award of $14,053.26 is so small in com-
parison to her actual injury and damage 
that justice demands that this court order 
an additur,6 or a new trial on the issue of 
damages, plaintiff points out that she has 
already incurred medical, hospital and re-
lated expenses of approximately $8,000, 
leaving only about $6,000 as general dam-
ages for pain and suffering and to take 
care of future expenses. In that connec-
tion, it should be remembered that the 
plaintiff had long been ii* ill health; that 
she was not shown to be gainfully employ-
ed, but lived with her daughter. 
[5, 6] Due to their advantaged position 
in close proximity to the trial, the parties 
and the witnesses; and their practical 
knowledge of the affairs of life as a back-
ground against which to weigh the evidence, 
the assessment of damages is something 
peculiarly within the prerogative of the 
jury to determine, and the court is ex-
tremely reluctant to interfere with their 
judgment in that regard.7 From the plain-
tiff's point of view, her insistence that the 
award is inadequate to her needs and 
desires is understandable. But we are 
obliged to look at the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
from in the light most favorable to the 
verdict. In doing so, we do not see it as so 
entirely beyond reason as to require that we 
upset it.8 
[7] Under our system it is contemplated 
that the right to trial by jury be assured. 
This is something more than a high-sound-
6. See Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 
327 P.2d 826. 
7. Stamp v. Union Pacific R. R., 5 Utah 2d 
397, 303 P.2d 279. 
8. Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 
327 P.2d 822. 
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ing phrase to be declaimed on patriotic 
occasions. It is the duty of courts to honor 
it in the observance. Whenever there is 
genuine dispute as to issues of fact upon 
which the parties' rights depend, they are 
entitled to have them submitted to and 
settled by a jury.9 When the parties have 
had a full and fair opportunity to present 
their cause, and the jury has rendered its 
verdict, it should not be interfered with 
unless there appears some compelling rea-
son why justice demands that it be don^. 
We find none here. Accordingly, the ver-
dict and the award of damages as found by 
the jury must stand. The order granting 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is set 
aside. Costs to plaintiff (appellant). 
MCDONOUGH, CALLISTER, and 
WADE, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, Chief Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent, disagreeing with the main 
opinion's assertion that the instant case is 
distinguishable from Lindsey v. Eccles 
Hotel. The main opinion says "There the 
plaintiff slipped on water spilled on the 
floor of a cafe. Both employees and 
customers had access to the water, so it 
would have involved mere conjecture as to 
who spilled it." Almost identical circum-
stances existed in the store, so it would 
have involved mere conjecture as to who 
placed the box on the floor. 
In the Lindsey case we said the same 
thing as has the main opinion and yet we 
arrived at an opposite result, when we 
asserted that "there was no evidence as to 
how the wJter got onto the floor, by whom 
it was deposited, exactly when it arrived 
there or that the defendant had knowledge 
of its presence" so that "under such cir-
cumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to 
speculate that the defendant was negligent." 
It is elementary that a plaintiff has the 
burden of showing negligence on the part 
9. See Htatcmcnt in Stickle v. Union P. R, 
It., 122 Utah 477, 251 P.2U 807. 
of defendant, and the showing here was, in 
my opinion, less impressive than in the 
Lindsey case. It is also elementary that a 
defendant knew of the hazard or reasonably 
should have known of it, and the opimoi.'b 
recitation of the facts that here was a little 
box of the type used in grocery stores 
usually not used by customers does not 
show a jury question, and it is far from 
proving negligence.1 
It seems to me that under the facts ad-
duced that proved nothing in the way of 
compensable negligence, makes the store 
owner an absolute insurer, far beyond any 
theory of liability based on a business in-
vitee theory. 
O I KCYHUMBtR iYSTCM, 
15 Utah 2d 118 
Harold BURLEIGH, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
John W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State 
Prison, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 10007. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 23, 1904. 
Habeas corpus case. The Fourth Dis-
trict Court, Utah County, R. LeRoy Tuck-
ett, J., entered order denying the petition, 
and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, 
Callister, J., held that judgment denying 
writ of habeas corpus was res judicata in 
later proceeding wherein writ of habeas 
corpus was sought on same grounds. 
Appeal dismissed. 
I. Habeas Corpus €=5|20 
Judgment denying writ of habeas cor-
pus was res judicata in later proceeding 
I. See HIHO Hampton v. Rowley, 10 Utah 
2d 109, 350 P.2d 151 (1900); Safeway 
Stores v. Ciner (Okl.), 380 P.2d 712 
(19G3). 
